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Abstract 
We find that the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme introduced in 2002 mainly works as intended. The scheme is cost-
effective and it is used by a large number of firms. It stimulates these firms to invest more in R&D, and, in particular, the 
effect is positive for small firms with little R&D experience. The returns on the R&D investments supported by the 
scheme are positive and generally not different from the returns to other R&D investments. We have found examples of 
what can be interpreted as tax motivated adjustments to the scheme, but to some extent this must be accepted as a cost 
to subsidy and support schemes intended for use by a large number of economic agents. This is particularly so when 
attempts are made to keep administrative expenditures and control routines at a low level. 
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Introduction8 
Policies to stimulate innovation and economic growth are 
high on the agenda in all OECD countries. A strong link 
between investments in research and economic growth is 
often taken for granted, and many countries have explicit 
and ambitious goals regarding the economy’s R&D 
intensity. Setting such goals suggests there is a role for 
government intervention, and that there are many 
potential market failures in the market for research and 
development. In theory, these could lead to 
overinvestment as well as underinvestment, but based on 
empirical research there is a fairly broad consensus that a 
free market underinvests in R&D.9 For this reason OECD 
countries use large sums on R&D subsidies, and innovation 
policy receives considerable attention in the public debate. 
However, there is no strong consensus regarding the 
effectiveness of such policies.  
R&D subsidies can be given as R&D tax credits or as direct 
grants.10 Tax incentives have become an increasingly 
popular policy tool over the last decades, and more than 
20 countries now use the tax system in order to increase 
R&D in industry. Norway has been the first Nordic 
country to introduce R&D tax credits.11 When the 
Norwegian Parliament approved the R&D tax credit 
scheme, it also decided that the scheme should be 
evaluated during its first five years of operation. Our 
research group in Statistics Norway was responsible for 
most of the evaluation, including the final report and the 
assessments made therein. In this paper we briefly discuss 
the main findings of the evaluation. 12 
                                                                
8 This paper is an English summary of the main evaluation report 
“Evaluering av SkatteFUNN”, Reports 2008/2, Statistics Norway, 
Oslo. The Research department of Statistics Norway was 
responsible for the evaluation, and the project was financed by 
the Research Council of Norway. 
9 See e.g. Griliches (2000) for a broad survey and Wieser (2005) 
for a recent meta-analysis.  
10 See Hall and van Reenen (2000), David, Hall and Toole (2000), 
Garcia-Quevedo (2004), Mohnen and Lokshin (2009) and Ientile 
and Mairesse (2009) for useful surveys of the literature on R&D 
subsidies. See also Bloom, Griffith and van Reenen (2002) for an 
authoritative empirical analysis of R&D tax credits. 
11 See Møen (2007) for a discussion of the pros et cons of 
introducing an R&D tax credit scheme in a small open economy. 
12 In total, 17 reports were produced as part of the evaluation 
project. The reports are available at the project’s website 
www.ssb.no/skattefunn. Some of these reports are written in 
English. 
The Introduction of an R&D Tax Credit Scheme in 
Norway 
The introduction of an R&D tax credit in Norway was 
proposed by the Hervik Commission in a green paper for 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 2000 (NOU 2000:7). 
The commission was appointed to suggest policy measures 
aimed at encouraging industry to invest more in R&D. The 
Norwegian Parliament had earlier in 2000 agreed to make 
increased R&D investments a national priority, and decided 
that R&D relative to GDP should at least reach the OECD 
average by 2005. This illustrates a general point. Generous 
R&D tax credit schemes are often introduced in countries 
where R&D investments are low by international 
standards, and where the sentiment is that “something 
needs to be done”.  
The Hervik commission suggested using an R&D tax credit 
as one of several policy tools to stimulate R&D 
investments. They argued that the proposed R&D tax 
credit would be administratively simpler and more robust 
to informational problems than direct R&D grants. It was 
intended to be the main policy tool towards small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs). In the commission’s opinion, 
the Research Council of Norway should focus on R&D of 
strategic importance, and spend their resources initiating 
and evaluating large projects. It also argued that an R&D 
tax credit scheme would provide more stable conditions 
for the business community than direct grants. The total 
subsidy would not be subject to annual budget debates, 
and the detailed regulations would be embedded in the 
general tax code. Of course, the specifics of the scheme, 
such as deduction rates and rules on eligibility etc. could 
change over time, but it was a widely held view that it 
would be less vulnerable to discretionary budget policy 
than direct R&D grants. 
In connection with the Norwegian Parliament’s processing 
of the revised national budget of 2001, the government 
was asked by a parliament majority to submit a proposal 
for a tax relief scheme for firms’ R&D expenses. The 
scheme was presented in connection with the national 
budget for 2002, passed by the Parliament in December 
2001 and brought into force for the fiscal year 2002. The 
scheme is codified in § 16-40 of the Norwegian Taxation 
Act. 
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The Details of the Scheme13 
The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme, “Skattefunn”, 
implies that a certain percentage of a firm’s R&D 
expenditures is deductible against taxes. The deduction is 
subject to specific criteria. A firm must meet the relevant 
terms and have its project plan approved by the Skattefunn 
secretariat which is part of the Research Council of 
Norway. Another government agency, Innovation Norway, 
is helping firms through the application process and makes 
a first assessment of whether the projects qualify for 
support or not. The actual R&D expenditures have to be 
approved by the tax authorities, who mainly base their 
judgement on a statement from the applicant’s auditor. 
Originally, only SMEs were eligible. An SME was defined as a 
firm fulfilling two of the following three criteria: (i) Fewer 
than 100 employees (ii) an annual turnover of less than 
NOK 80 million  – about EUR ten million (iii) an annual 
balance sheet total of less than NOK 40 million – about 
EUR five million.  
Already in 2003 large enterprises were included as well. 
Large enterprises may deduct 18 percent of expenses 
related to an approved R&D project from taxes owed. A 20 
percent deduction is possible if the following conditions for 
being a “small enterprise” are fulfilled: (i) Fewer than 250 
employees, (ii) an annual turnover not exceeding EUR40 
million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
27 million and (iii) less than 25 per cent of the company 
is owned by a large enterprise. This distinction between 
large and small enterprises follows EU/EEA state aid rules.14 
The maximum basis for deduction was at the outset NOK 4 
million per year (about EUR 500 000) for R&D projects 
conducted by the enterprise itself. Stimulating cooperation 
between academia and commerce is considered an 
important objective of the scheme. For this reason, a firm 
could purchase R&D services from universities and R&D 
institutes for another NOK 4 million under the scheme. If 
the firm did not conduct in-house R&D, it could purchase 
R&D services for a total of NOK 8 million. This cap was the 
maximum sum from which a tax deduction could be 
calculated. In 2009, the caps were increased to NOK 5.5 
and 11 million, respectively. 
                                                                
13 The following description borrows from OECD (2007, p. 112), 
Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007b, Appendix A) and 
http://web.skattefunn.no/index.php?kat=English.  
14 EEA is the European Economic Area of which Norway is a part. 
Norway is not a member of the EU. 
In order to qualify for the tax credit, the R&D activity must 
come under the definition of R&D as stipulated in the 
scheme. This definition is very similar to that given in the 
Frascati manual. The project must be limited and focused, 
and it must be aimed at generating new knowledge, 
information or experience which is presumed to be of use 
for the enterprise in developing new or improved 
products, services or manufacturing/processing methods. 
Standard product development with no research 
component is not covered by the scheme. 
There are no constraints or extra incentives in the scheme 
based on industry or region. Enterprises that are not 
currently liable to taxation are also eligible. If the tax credit 
exceeds the tax payable by the firm, the difference is paid 
to the firm in the form of a negative tax or a grant. If the 
firm is not in a tax position at all, the whole amount of the 
tax credit is paid to the firm as a grant. In practice this has 
turned out to be a very important feature of the scheme. 
Around three-quarters of the total support given through 
the scheme is paid out as grants. The payment is made 
when the tax authorities have completed their tax 
assessment, and takes place the year after the actual R&D 
expenses have occurred. The R&D tax credit is thus 
neutral with regard to qualifying projects, regions, 
industries and the tax position of the qualifying firms, but 
lowers the marginal cost of low R&D spenders and is 
slightly more generous to small firms than to large firms. 
For firms that would have spent more on R&D than the 
maximum amount in the scheme even without the 
presence of the tax credit, the scheme gives little or no 
incentive on the margin to increase R&D investments, 
although they have a clear incentive to qualify for the 
scheme and receive the tax deduction.15 
Applications, R&D Expenses and Tax Deductions 
The total maximum tax deduction for a small 
establishment was at the outset NOK 1.6 million per year 
(20 % of 8 million). For large establishments included in the 
scheme in 2003, it was NOK 1.44 million (18 % of 8 
million).16 However, the average tax deduction per tax 
credit project has been much lower than this. Table 1 
                                                                
15 In theory, the presence of liquidity constraints or internal 
political processes related to the investment budget could also 
give firms whose R&D expenditures exceed the maximum 
amount of the scheme an incentive to increase their R&D 
investments.   
16 The maximum deductions increased by 37.5 per cent in 2009. 
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below shows the development in the number of 
applications, budgeted and actual R&D expenses, as well 
tax deductions in the years 2002-2009. Figures for R&D 
are based on data from the Research Council of Norway 
and tax data from the Directorate of Taxes.  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of applications by year of submission   
Total number of applications 3287 4739 4225 3176 2624 2104 2071 2121
Applications approved 2798 3532 2762 2177 1801 1530 1549 1596
Applications rejected  397  974 1160  699   543 574 522 525
Percentage approved (incl. withdrawn applications) 85 75 65 69  70 73 75 75
   
Active projects, budgeted and actual R&D costs, NOK mill.   
Number of active projects 2798 5571 6079 5137 4055 3735 3527 3560
Total budgeted R&D costs (approved projects, figures from NFR) 4526 9032 9643 9003 8457 7500 8300 9300
Total actual R&D expenses approved by auditor (figures from SKD) 4098 7543 8189 7412 6889 5900 6300 n.a
   
Total tax reduction 690 1274 1388 1220 1126 952 1004 n.a
Of which paid out as a grant 568 991 1055 908   824 n.a n.a n.a
Total corporate taxes payable for firm receiving tax deductions 164 2743 4960 4055 4648 n.a n.a n.a
   
Actual R&D expenses in per cent of the budget 91 84 85 82  81 79 76 n.a
Paid deduction in per cent of total deductions 82 78 76 74  73 n.a n.a n.a
Deductions in per cent of corporate taxes payable 42 46 28 30  24 n.a n.a n.a
Table 1. Applications, R&D expenses and tax deductions 
For the years 2002-2006, the table corresponds to Table 
1.1 in Cappelen et al (2008). The table is updated with 
three more years using numbers from annual reports 
published by the Skattefunn secretariat at 
www.skattefunn.no. SKD is the Norwegian Directorate of 
Taxes. NFR is the Research Council of Norway. n.a means 
not available. 
The number of applications received by the R&D tax credit 
secretariat has varied over time. In the first year, 2002, 
there were 3300 applications. When the scheme was made 
universal in 2003 the number increased to 4700 
applications, but thereafter it has gradually fallen. In 2009 
there were 2100 applications. About 25-30 percent of the 
applications are rejected, withdrawn or returned due to 
incomplete information. Some of the applications are for 
projects that last for several years, and the number of 
“active projects” under the scheme has varied between 
3000 and 6000. Some firms apply for several projects 
simultaneously, and the average number of projects per 
firm is 1.5-1.6. The total R&D expenses under the scheme 
have been fairly stable because the average project size has 
increased over time.  About two thirds of the R&D 
expenses are personnel costs, which is quite typical for 
R&D-projects. The actual R&D costs reported to the tax 
authorities tend to be about 20 percent lower than what is 
proposed in the original applications to the Research 
Council. About 85 percent of the costs applied for are 
accepted by the tax authorities as a basis for deduction. 
In 2006, the total tax deduction was 140 million Euros. 
Out of this as much as 100 million Euros were paid out as 
a grant from the tax authorities to firms that were not in a 
tax position or would have paid less in taxes than their 
R&D tax relief. This illustrates the fact that the scheme is 
particularly popular with small and newly established firms. 
Roughly 85 percent of all approved projects are 
undertaken by firms with less than 50 employees. 50-60 
percent of the applications are from firms with less than 
ten employees. These firms perform about 45 percent of 
the total R&D under the scheme. For all firms receiving 
subsidies through the R&D tax credit scheme, the average 
tax credit is about 1000 Euros per employee. Average 
corporate tax paid per employee for the same firms in 
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absence of the subsidy would have been 2300 Euros. 
Hence, in these terms, the subsidy is rather substantial.17 
The R&D tax credit scheme is used by 10-15 percent of all 
manufacturing firms, but only one percent of the firms in 
construction and most service sectors. 18 Due to a large 
number of firms in the service sector, however, the 
number of applications from service firms is somewhat 
larger than the number of applications from manufacturing 
firms. Low average R&D intensity is a general characteristic 
of the service industries worldwide, and in most tax credit 
schemes in Europe, services are not included. The number 
of applications from firms in the service industries has 
increased over time, and in 2008, 55 % of the applications 
where filed by firms in a service industry. 
Within the service sector, firms using the tax credit are 
concentrated in two industries, computing (NACE 72) and 
consulting (NACE 74.1-74.4). The ICT-industry in total 
performs 19 % of the R&D that is supported under the tax 
credit scheme. No other industry has a larger share. In 
addition a large number of projects in other industries are 
ICT-related. In 2009, 42 percent of all accepted 
applications were classified as ICT.  
OECD Asessment and Recent Changes to the 
Scheme 
OECD (2007, p. 112), describes the Norwegian R&D tax 
credit scheme as rather generous by international 
standards. The OECD’s “B-index” calculations averaged 
about 22 percent in 2006. This is well above the OECD 
average and is exceeded only by Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Portugal, Mexico and Spain. It should be noted, 
however, that the calculations do not take into account 
caps in tax deduction schemes. For Norway, therefore, the 
B-index applies to a firm not constrained by the cap in the 
tax credit scheme. Direct government funding of private 
R&D in Norway was 0.11 percent of GDP in 2004. This is 
close to the OECD average, and well above the median. As 
mentioned already, the caps were increased in the fiscal 
year 2009. 
As from the fiscal year 2007, a maximum hourly rate and a 
maximum number of hours per year for in-house R&D 
personnel were introduced. The ceiling for payroll and 
indirect expenses was set at NOK 500 per hour (around 
                                                                
17 These numbers are based on an analysis of data for 2005. 
18 These numbers are based on an analysis of data for 2004. 
60 Euro). Up to 1850 hours per year may be approved per 
person associated with the project. This has made the 
scheme slightly less generous than in previous years, in 
particular for firms in the ICT-industries where salaries are 
high. 
The Norwegian Parliament decided in 2005 to include 
financial support to unpaid labour in R&D activities in the 
tax credit scheme, in order to reach high tech 
entrepreneurs that do not draw wages from their firms. 
The amendment needed approval from the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority (ESA). ESA did not conclude until 
March 2008. Support to unpaid labour was paid for the 
years 2002-2005, but the Norwegian government decided 
not to continue this type of support despite the positive 
ruling by ESA.  
The 2007 OECD survey makes some normative comments 
about the scheme:  
The broadly neutral construction of the Skattefunn 
is a point in its favour, especially in Norway where 
there is a long tradition of including regional, social 
and sectoral goals in industrial policy. Of course, 
lower taxes on firms have to be compensated by 
higher taxes elsewhere. It is also possible that firms 
now claim tax credits against spending that they 
would not previously have classified as R&D. ... The 
effectiveness of the Skattefunn in stimulating 
additional private R&D is currently under 
evaluation. ... [T]here is the possibility that even if 
the tax credit stimulates genuine additional R&D, 
the tax expenditures could have been better used in 
other areas. 
Main Findings from OUR Evaluation: Does the Tax 
Credit Work as Intended? 
Statistics Norway was asked to evaluate the R&D tax 
credit scheme along several dimensions:  
• The scheme’s ability to stimulate extra R&D effort and 
change firms’ R&D behaviour 
• The scheme’s effect on innovation and value creation in 
firms 
• The scheme’s user-friendliness 
• The scheme’s administrative costs for users, tax 
authorities, the Research Council and other public 
agencies 
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• The scheme’s effect on R&D cooperation between 
firms and research institutes 
• The relation between the R&D tax credit scheme and 
other R&D incentives 
• How the Norwegian scheme compares to R&D tax 
credit schemes in other countries, and the experience 
other countries have with such schemes 
• The quality of the projects supported under the 
scheme and the extent to which they are tax motivated 
(including reclassification of other costs) 
Below, we summarize our main findings. The evaluation 
utilized data from 1993 to 2006. The evaluation project 
started in 2004 and concluded in January 2008. 
Input Additionality: Does the Tax Credit Scheme 
Lead to More R&D in Firms? 
Hægeland and Møen (2007a) evaluate the degree of input 
additionality, i.e. to what extent the scheme induces firms 
to invest more in R&D than they otherwise would have 
done. This is obviously a critical aspect when evaluating the 
overall efficiency of the scheme. Identifying this effect in a 
non-experimental setting, where access to the scheme is in 
principle universal, is difficult. Hægeland and Møen use a 
difference-in-difference regression approach in their main 
analysis.  
Their descriptive analyses clearly show that firms that have 
received support through the tax credit scheme have more 
growth in their R&D investments than other firms. The 
difference-in-difference regressions show that firms that 
previously invested less than the 4 million in-house R&D 
cap have increased their R&D investments more than 
those previously above the cap. The latter group is used as 
a control group because firms that invest more than the 4 
million cap are not subsidized at the margin and hence 
have little or no incentive to increase their R&D 
expenditure as a result of the R&D tax credit scheme.19  
The estimated input additionality is mainly driven by firms 
that did not invest very much in R&D before the tax credit 
scheme was introduced. Hægeland and Møen also find that 
firms that previously did not invest in R&D were more 
likely to start doing so after the introduction of the tax 
credit scheme. The additionality appears to be strongest in 
small firms, firms in non-central areas, firms in which the 
                                                                
19 See, however, our remark in footnote 15. 
employees have a relatively low level of education and 
firms in industries that are traditionally not research 
intensive. Obviously, these firms are typically small R&D 
performers. 
The empirical results in Hægeland and Møen (2007a) are 
consistent with the tax credit scheme being effective in 
stimulating R&D investments. The main results are 
qualitatively the same across various data sources and 
model specifications. The estimates of how much extra 
R&D the tax credits trigger per NOK in lost tax revenue 
vary between 1.3 and 2.9, with 2 representing the best 
point estimate. This is high in comparison to other 
estimates in the international literature, see e.g. Ientile and 
Mairesse (2009), and it implies that for every Norwegian 
krone received by the firms in tax deduction, two kroner 
are spent on R&D. However, it is worth noting that the 
strategy used to identify the effect of the tax credit scheme 
is not bullet proof. The main reason for this is that the tax 
credit scheme is available to all firms. A causal 
interpretation of the results rests among other things on 
the assumption that small and large R&D firms (below and 
above the 4 million cap) are equally affected by changes in 
economic trends and macroeconomic framework 
conditions other than the tax credit scheme. In addition, 
the effects are estimated with considerable uncertainty. 
Output Additionality: Does the Tax Credit Lead to 
Increased Added Value and More Innovations? 
Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007a) find that the tax 
credit scheme contributes to an increase in the rate of 
innovation in firms. Tax credit projects contribute to the 
development of new production processes and to some 
extent to new products for the firm. It is shown that firms 
that collaborate with other firms are more likely to have 
successful innovations. However, the scheme does not 
appear to contribute to innovations in the form of new 
products for the market or firms’ patenting.  Cappelen, 
Raknerud and Rybalka (2007b) find that tax credit projects 
have a positive effect on productivity and productivity 
growth, to about the same extent as other R&D activity. 
There is a tendency for the return to be slightly higher for 
pure company-financed R&D work than for R&D carried 
out under the tax credit scheme. This is in line with 
expectations. On average, Cappelen, Raknerud and 
Rybalka find that business profitability increases 
moderately as a result of the tax credit scheme. However, 
the return on R&D financed under the scheme is very 
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unevenly distributed between recipient firms, and 28 per 
cent of the firms have zero returns. These return 
estimates are based on data from the first few years after 
the scheme was introduced. This may imply that the 
estimates are somewhat on the low side. However, the 
R&D that the tax credit has stimulated is probably so 
market oriented that the results of the innovations will 
typically emerge shortly after the project has been 
completed. 
External effects of R&D are difficult to estimate with any 
precision. Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007c) find 
that the increased R&D investments that the tax credit 
scheme leads to, have the greatest positive effect in R&D-
intensive industries and counties. This may suggest that 
there are positive external effects. However, the 
innovations that the scheme mainly stimulates – new 
products for the firm and not for the market – are not of 
such a nature that large external effects should be 
expected. 
Behavioural Additionality: Does the Tax Credit 
Lead to Changes in R&D Behaviour in Firms?20 
A main finding in the input additionality analysis is that the 
tax credit scheme stimulates firms with no or limited 
previous R&D activity to initiate such activity. One might 
argue that this implies a change in firm behavior. However, 
the fact that a firm changes its adaptation, by responding to 
the introduction of the tax credit scheme, does not mean 
that it changes its behaviour, i.e. the way it responds. In 
order to explore this issue, Alsos et al. (2007) examine the 
firm’s internal working methods and processes, with 
particular focus on the significance of entrepreneurial 
information and dynamic capabilities for change. A survey 
among firms that applied for the tax credit shows that a 
very high percentage of these firms have increased their 
focus on R&D as a result of the tax credit scheme, and 
that the scheme has resulted in the firms having closer 
contact with universities, university colleges, research 
institutes, customers and suppliers. Whether firms have 
the motivation, ability and resources to succeed with 
innovation, is vital to what effect public policy instruments 
have on R&D behaviour. The survey shows that many 
firms receiving the tax credit change their R&D behaviour, 
and that positive development in R&D behaviour to a large 
                                                                
20 The sub-project on behavioural additionality, was carried out 
by Nordland Research Institute. 
extent can be explained by internal conditions of the firms, 
e.g. the firms’ resource base, dynamic capabilities and 
entrepreneurial information. Alsos et al. find that firms 
with limited R&D experience at the start-up of a project 
have changed their R&D behaviour the most. Firms with a 
high level of R&D activity before the start-up of an R&D 
tax credit project do not report a positive change in R&D 
behaviour. The analysis shows that these firms do not 
manage to increase their level of R&D activity over time. 
Does the R&D Tax Credit Lead to More 
Collaboration Between Industry and Research 
Institutes? 
One of the purposes of the tax credit scheme is to 
stimulate collaboration between firms and research 
institutes and universities. Cappelen et al. (2008, ch. 5) 
report that between 2002 and 2006 almost every fifth firm 
purchased R&D services from a research institute 
approved by the Research Council. Hægeland and Møen 
(2007a, ch. 6.4) find that the probability of initiating such an 
external collaboration has only increased slightly after the 
introduction of the tax credit scheme, and that the 
probability of continuing such collaboration for those who 
already collaborate, remains unchanged. Hægeland and 
Møen also find that the input additionality effect of such 
collaboration projects is slightly lower than for R&D 
activities carried out solely in-house. 
Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007a) find indications 
that the tax credit scheme stimulates collaboration 
between firms to a limited extent only.  One reason is 
obviously that the tax credit scheme is not designed with 
this purpose in mind. Another reason may be that projects 
under the scheme lead to innovations of the type “new 
production processes” or “developing a new product for 
the firm, not for the market”. It is not surprising that there 
are not many collaboration projects between firms 
carrying out innovations of this nature. However, firms 
that do collaborate with other firms are more likely to 
succeed with their innovations. 
To What Extent Does the Tax Credit Scheme 
Affect the Utilisation of Other Innovation Policy 
Instruments? 
Hægeland and Møen (2007b) analyse the relationship 
between the R&D tax credit scheme and other innovation 
policy instruments. They find no evidence suggesting that 
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the R&D tax credit increases the probability of receiving 
direct R&D grants from the Research Council of Norway 
in the future, but they cannot exclude the possibility of an 
immediate positive effect. Firms with R&D tax credit 
projects have an increased likelihood of receiving direct 
R&D grants from the Research Council in the same year. 
At the individual firm level, therefore, direct subsidies and 
the tax credit seem to be complements. At the more 
aggregate level, however, the two instruments seem to be 
substitutes as the probability of receiving direct R&D 
grants fell after the introduction of the tax credit scheme. 
In the years after the introduction of the tax credit 
scheme, firms that applied for support from the Research 
Council or received support from Innovation Norway in 
one year, were much more likely to reapply the year after 
as compared to the years prior to the scheme. It therefore 
seems that the R&D tax credit scheme has stimulated 
greater persistence in the use of other policy instruments. 
It is easy to demonstrate that firms receiving the R&D tax 
credit are in contact with the innovation policy system to a 
greater extent than other firms, but this cannot be 
interpreted as a causal effect. Both the Research Council 
of Norway and Innovation Norway require firms to apply 
for the R&D tax credit before other additional support is 
provided. However, firms that have not previously been in 
contact with the innovation policy system are more likely 
to have such contact after the R&D tax credit scheme was 
introduced. This suggests that the tax credit scheme has 
made the innovation policy system available to a new 
group of firms.  
Hægeland and Møen (2007b, ch. 5) also analyse how the 
input additionality varies between different R&D policy 
instruments. They find that the additionality is high for 
both R&D tax credits and for direct R&D grants from the 
Research Council of Norway, while project support from 
ministries and the EU has lower additionality.  
To What Extent Does the R&D Tax Credit Affect 
the Strategy of Research Institutes? 
Cappelen et al (2008, ch. 5) report that 19 per cent of the 
firms receiving an R&D tax credit in 2006 had deductions 
for the purchase of R&D services from approved R&D 
institutes. Even more firms stated in questionnaires that 
they had formed collaborations with such institutes, and it 
is of course possible to collaborate without purchasing of 
services partly financed by the R&D tax credit scheme. The 
firms believed that these collaborative relations are 
important for the execution and success of projects. A 
survey of 18 approved research institutes showed that 
many institutes had no knowledge as to which of the 
projects they were involved in that were partly financed by 
R&D tax credits. This is not surprising since the firms 
receiving the R&D tax credit do not have any incentives to 
report this to the institutes.  
The R&D tax credit scheme does not seem to have a great 
bearing on the research institutes in terms of research 
volume, nor does it seem to have affected the research 
institutes’ behaviour to any notable degree. One institute 
stated that it had a tendency to increase its prices if it 
knew that the project was financed through the tax credit 
scheme. Some institutes had mentioned the possibility of 
receiving the tax credit to firms that made contact 
regarding project collaboration, but no institute had used 
the fact that collaborative R&D would qualify for a tax 
credit actively in their marketing efforts.  
To What Extent Are the Supported R&D Projects 
Tax-Motivated? 
Money allocated through the R&D tax credit scheme 
should be spent on R&D, but the tax authorities must to a 
large extent rely on the taxpayer’s own declaration when 
calculating the tax deduction. Fjærli (2007) reports that the 
majority of auditors believe that it is difficult to control 
whether the sums specified are actually spent on R&D. The 
most difficult aspect is whether the reported man-hours 
used are realistic. 80 per cent of the auditors perceived 
this to be difficult, and their perception is strengthened by 
Fjærli’s own analysis. He reviews around 300 project 
accounts collected from one county for the years 2003 and 
2004. The time sheets were often of poor quality and only 
about half were of sufficient quality to be used in the 
analysis. A comparison of the usable parts of these time 
sheets with what firms report in the R&D surveys 
conducted by Statistics Norway, shows that time recorded 
per employee in the timesheets is 50 to 100 per cent 
higher than expected based on the firms’ characteristics. 
This could be an indication that the time spent on R&D in 
tax credit projects is overestimated in the project 
accounts.  Some firms have extremely high tax deductions, 
high budgeted R&D costs measured per employee, and 
unreasonably high personnel costs measured in relation to 
the firm’s actual salary costs.  It is, however, difficult to 
obtain an accurate picture of the extent of the inflation of 
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R&D costs. The suspicious numbers seem to be driven by 
the five to ten per cent of the firms with the highest values. 
These firms are generally small, typically having less than 10 
employees.  
Small firms with just one employee are often sole 
proprietor limited companies with an active owner. These 
firms are well suited to investigate tax-motivated disposals 
since other explanations such as the demand for expensive 
well-educated personnel are eliminated. Among these 
firms, Fjærli often finds that both the tax deduction and the 
budgeted R&D costs are high compared to the firm’s 
actual salary payments. This may indicate that tax 
adjustments are made through the reporting of inflated 
man-hours in the R&D tax credit projects, or that the 
hourly rate of pay used does not correspond with actual 
salary. The salary paid is sometimes very high in these 
firms, however, often despite low operating profit. In 
similar firms with no R&D tax credit financed activities, the 
operating profit adjusted for own salary is higher, while the 
actual salary is lower. This suggests that tax adjustments 
sometimes are made through an increase in the calculation 
basis for the hourly rate of pay. 
How Accessible and User-Friendly is the Tax 
Credit Scheme? 
As a part of the evaluation, Statistics Norway conducted 
two surveys asking firms’ about their experiences with the 
R&D tax credit scheme, one in 2005 and one in 2007. 
These are analyzed in Foyn and Kjesbu (2006) and Foyn 
and Lien (2007), respectively. A general finding is that firms 
with approved projects are far more positive to the 
scheme than firms that have had projects rejected. 
Furthermore, the firms are generally more positive to the 
tax credit scheme in the 2007 survey than in the 2005 
survey. The 2005 survey showed that the tax credit 
scheme was well known already at that time.  On the 
whole, the firms are satisfied with the information about 
the scheme that is available at the Skattefunn website, 
www.skattefunn.no. The responses in 2007 are similar to 
those of the first survey, but reveal that a relatively high 
percentage of firms are not sufficiently familiar with the 
regulations of the scheme. This applies in particular to the 
provision that the calculated tax deduction is paid out as a 
grant in cases where firms are not liable to taxation, or 
where the assessed tax is less than the deduction. 
Although many firms state that the information on the 
Skattefunn website is good, almost half of them contacted 
the Skattefunn secretariat or Innovation Norway during 
the application process. The majority of enquiries related 
to whether or not their project met the criteria of the 
scheme. The firms would like more precise information 
about the requirements for a project to be approved, i.e. 
they ask for more predictability. Numerous firms have 
used consultants with extensive knowledge of the R&D tax 
credit scheme to formulate applications, in order to make 
it easier to facilitate the approval of their application. Firms 
that have had their application rejected tend to claim that 
policy makers and public servants do not understand the 
specifics of their industry. A particularly common claim 
was that there is a lack of understanding of how R&D is 
performed in various service industries. This is supported 
by Skattefunn’s own statistics, which show a higher 
rejection rate for projects in the service industries.  
However, this has gradually changed as Innovation Norway 
and the Skattefunn secretariat have gained more 
experience with service industry projects.   
Firms with approved projects were very satisfied with the 
R&D tax credit scheme. Within this group 90 per cent 
reported in the 2007 survey that they were very or fairly 
positive to the tax credit scheme, 57 per cent said they 
had not changed their opinion since the scheme was 
introduced, 30 per cent said they had become more 
positive to the scheme, and only ten per cent said they had 
become more negative. The latter is perhaps due to the 
introduction of a maximum hourly rate of NOK 500 in 
2007. Numerous firms commented on this change. Even 
though firms that had had projects rejected were more 
negative than firms with approved projects, a majority of 
the former firms were also positive to the scheme. 12 per 
cent said that they had become more positive to the 
scheme than when it was first introduced despite having 
had their projects rejected. The vast majority of these 
firms, 80 per cent, found the rejection to be unreasonable. 
Most firms, 60 per cent, also perceived the basis for the 
rejection to be poor.  A number of firms think that the 
process, involving three government bodies, needs to be 
simplified. With regard to approval of the R&D content, 
the Skattefunn secretariat has the final word and receives 
the most criticism. A high number of firms complain about 
the detailed project accounts that are required by the tax 
authorities. It seems that this requirement is not 
communicated clearly enough in the guidelines to the 
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scheme. Many firms are also critical to the tax authorities’ 
corrections to their project accounts. The share of firms 
that think the ceiling for deductible costs should be raised 
increased between the two surveys. This is most likely 
because the ceiling had remained nominally constant from 
the introduction of the scheme in 2002. However, only 22 
per cent of all firms receiving the tax credit in 2006 made 
full use of the cap of NOK 4 million for in-house R&D. 
About 60 per cent of the firms suggested that the scheme 
should be changed so that they would not have to wait a 
whole year to receive the tax relief payments. 
The Administrative Costs of the Tax Credit 
Scheme 
The administrative costs of the tax credit scheme consist 
of the firms’ costs and the government’s costs. Firms incur 
costs when writing applications, preparing annual and final 
reports and providing control and certification of the 
project accounts. The government incurs costs in running 
the scheme in Innovation Norway, the Research Council of 
Norway and the tax authorities. 
Based on user surveys, Foyn and Lien (2007) estimate the 
firms’ own costs for applications and final reporting to be 
NOK 35 million for 2006. This is based on an average of 
30 hours for completing applications and ten hours for 
preparing the final reporting for a total of 2,500 
applications and 2,000 annual reports (approved projects). 
The costs per firm vary considerably. An hourly rate of 
NOK 365 was used when estimating costs. However, if the 
maximum hourly rate that applies to R&D tax credit 
projects for 2007 is used (NOK 500), the costs increase to 
NOK 48 million. About a third of the firms report that 
they use a consultant for this work. Assuming that an 
average of four hours are invoiced at an hourly rate of 
NOK 1,000, this amounts to NOK four million. The user 
survey shows that it is not uncommon for consultants to 
work on a “no approval, no fee” basis. Auditing costs are 
estimated at NOK 12 million. This estimate is also 
uncertain, since there are large variations in how much 
time the auditors spend on each form. A survey conducted 
among auditors suggests that they spend on average four 
hours on each form and that the hourly rate is about NOK 
1,250. The firms’ total costs therefore amount to NOK 47 
million, excluding consultancy costs and assuming an hourly 
rate of NOK 365 for the firms’ use of time. This makes up 
about four per cent of the firms’ total tax deductions. 
In addition to the firms’ costs, the government also incurs 
costs. The Skattefunn secretariat at the Research Council 
of Norway has a budget of NOK 15 million for running the 
scheme, and Innovation Norway receives NOK eight 
million for its Skattefunn services. The costs of the tax 
authorities are more difficult to calculate, especially since 
the control efforts vary somewhat from year to year and 
between regions. The direct costs for tax audits in 2005 
are estimated to be only NOK 250,000 based on a survey 
among tax offices. If estimated costs for auditing and 
handling complaints are also included, the total cost to the 
tax administration can be estimated to NOK 3.2 million. 
Some costs are also incurred by the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. These are 
estimated by the Government Agency for Financial 
Management (SSØ) to be NOK 1.4 million. The cost to all 
government agencies involved therefore amounted to 
about NOK 28 million in 2006. 
The above figures sum up to a total cost of approximately 
NOK 75 million for the firms and the public sector in 
2006. This corresponds to almost seven per cent of the 
total tax relief that year.21 The administrative costs in the 
public sector alone correspond to only two per cent of the 
tax relief. This is very modest. The total estimated costs 
for the government are NOK 1,126 million in tax expenses 
and NOK 28 million in administrative costs, giving a total 
of NOK 1.15 billion. If we include a tax financing cost in 
the form of a 20 per cent efficiency loss (in order to 
account for the amount that needs  to be financed from an 
increase in other taxes which distorts the resource use in 
the economy), the public costs of the R&D tax credit 
scheme amount to NOK 1.4 billion for 2006. This is less 
than 0.1 % of GDP. 
Discussion of our Main Findings 
We have found that the R&D tax credit scheme has a large 
and positive effect on industry’s R&D activity. An input 
additionality factor of around two is high compared to 
what is previously found in the international literature. The 
R&D tax credit scheme, which was introduced in 2002, has 
been in use during a period in which the increase in 
industry’s overall R&D activity has been modest. In 2005, 
the total R&D expenses in Norway were NOK 29.6 
billion, which constitute 1.5 per cent of GDP. Of this, 
                                                                
21 Mohnen and Lokshin (2009, footnote 4) report that the total 
administrative costs are about nine per cent of total support in 
both the Dutch and Canadian R&D tax credit schemes. 
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industry accounted for NOK 13.6 billion, the institute 
sector for NOK 6.9 billion and the university and 
university college sector for the remaining NOK 9.1 
billion. Our additionality estimate shows that without the 
tax credit scheme, the industry’s R&D activity would have 
been NOK 2.4 billion lower this year. A good half of this 
can be linked to small firms with less than ten employees, 
which were excluded from the R&D statistics in 2005. We 
therefore estimate that the industry’s R&D activity 
according to the R&D statistics would have been around 
NOK 12.4 billion in 2005 if the tax credit scheme had not 
existed. Its total share of GDP in 2005 would have been 
0.6 per cent, down from 0.8 per cent in 2001 - the last 
observation before the R&D tax credit scheme was 
introduced. Even with our lowest additionality estimate of 
1.3, the R&D share would have fallen without the tax 
credit scheme. 
It may be questioned whether it is reasonable that the 
R&D activity in industry should have decreased to such an 
extent during the period we consider. It is a common 
assumption that R&D expenses are procyclical, i.e. that 
their growth in real terms is positively correlated with the 
GDP growth. If this is the case, business cycle conditions 
could be an acceptable explanation for the first two or 
three years after 2001, but not thereafter when the 
Norwegian economy boomed. On the other hand, a 
number of Nordic countries have reported a certain 
stagnation and relative downturn in the intensity of R&D 
activity in the 2000s, so the development in Norway is not 
exceptional. Nevertheless, our counterfactual result of 
what the R&D investments would have been without the 
R&D tax credit scheme is somewhat surprising when 
viewed in relation to the macroeconomic development. 
That R&D is procyclical, may be most relevant to large 
firms that are dominant in the R&D surveys in the OECD 
countries. It is possible that R&D is counter-cyclical for the 
small firms which are dominant in the Norwegian R&D tax 
credit scheme. Small firms may not be in a position to 
increase their R&D activity to any great degree during a 
boom in the economy. On the basis of limited resources as 
a whole, small firms may cut down on R&D activities in 
order to increase their production capacity during times of 
prosperity. If this is so, it may explain why there was a 
decrease in the number of tax credit applications after 
2004. On the other hand, according to the 2006 R&D 
survey by Statistics Norway, large firms did not increase 
their R&D activity very much either during the economic 
recovery from 2003 to 2006. 22 
We have concluded that the R&D tax credit scheme has 
made a positive contribution to industry’s R&D activity, 
but, strictly speaking, this is just an essential prerequisite 
for defending the scheme. In light of our findings, it could 
be asked why the authorities should stimulate R&D activity 
in projects that are as market-oriented as those that the 
Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme seems to be 
stimulating. What market failure is it that the scheme is 
correcting? Our evaluation shows that the scheme 
primarily stimulates small firms’ R&D activity, and 
particularly R&D in firms that have not previously carried 
out much R&D. The R&D that the tax credit scheme 
stimulates does not seem to create innovations of a kind 
that can be expected to have large external effects. When 
we find that small firms seem to respond most strongly to 
the R&D tax credit, this can be explained in two ways. 
These firms have first of all been given a major price 
reduction on R&D and have responded by increasing their 
R&D activity. Second, their response may be due to the 
fact that they face financing problems linked to their R&D 
activity, and that the scheme has helped solve these 
problems. The latter explanation is consistent with a large 
part of the total tax deductions being paid as a grant to 
firms that are not in a tax position. The first component 
has nothing to do with market failure, while the second 
does and has been used to justify government R&D 
policies, cf. Hall (2002). It could be argued that financing 
problems are not helped to any great extent in the current 
scheme since the support that is paid to firms that are not 
liable to taxation takes place well after the project costs 
have been incurred. On the other hand, an approved 
project will act as a kind of security, since it is almost 
certain to entail a future payout. The evaluation has 
revealed that many firms regard liquidity as a problem. 
In the current tax credit scheme, the Research Council of 
Norway approves the project, while the tax authorities 
approve the tax deductions. This implies that even when a 
firm’s project has been approved, there remains some 
uncertainty as to what support the firm will actually 
receive. Legal disputes sometimes arise between the firms 
                                                                
22 If large and small R&D firms are affected in different ways by 
the economic cycles, the assumption that we have had to use as a 
basis for the additionality analysis is not valid. What drives the 
R&D growth in large and small R&D firms is an issue that we 
would like to explore further in future research. 
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and the tax administration although the scope for this is 
limited in Norway as compared to countries in which prior 
approval of projects is not part of the scheme.  
Conclusions 
We find that the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme 
introduced in 2002 mainly works as intended. The scheme 
is cost-effective and it is used by a large number of firms. It 
stimulates these firms to invest more in R&D, and in 
particular, the effect is positive for small firms with little 
R&D experience. The returns on the R&D investments 
supported by the scheme are positive and generally not 
different from the returns to other R&D investments. We 
have found examples of what can be interpreted as tax 
motivated misuse of the scheme, but to some extent one 
must accept this as a cost to subsidy and support schemes 
intended for use by a large number of economic agents. 
This is particularly so when administrative expenditures 
and control routines are kept at a low level. 
A follow-up question to the above main conclusion is 
whether there might be alternatives to Skattefunn, that 
might perform even better. This issue has not been a main 
focus in our evaluation. However, in our analysis of the 
interaction between different R&D policy instruments, 
Skattefunn stands out as a good scheme. In line with the 
Hervik Committee’s argument for having a broad set of 
instruments in the R&D policy, we believe that a scheme in 
the style of Skattefunn is well justified.  
There are a number of alternatives to the current 
Norwegian scheme. However, we do not believe that any 
of the international alternatives have any obvious benefits, 
and in particular we do not recommend converting to a 
system supporting the increase in R&D as opposed to the 
level of R&D, i.e. we recommend retaining a volume-based 
scheme rather than choosing an incremental scheme. 
Experience and common sense tell us that volume-based 
schemes are the easiest to administer. An incremental 
scheme might produce higher input additionality than a 
volume-based scheme because it provides special stimulus 
for firms that increase their R&D activity significantly, but 
international studies are not clear on this point.  
Moreover, it is not clear which market failure argument 
applies in particular to firms that grow rapidly. 
The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme has two provisions 
that favour specific types of firms. First, small and medium 
sized firms receive a slightly higher tax deduction than 
large firms where size is measured in terms of number of 
employees, turnover etc. We have no evaluation results 
that clearly address whether the difference in the 
deduction percentages (20 versus 18 per cent) is rational. 
Simplicity suggests that a single deduction rate of 20 per 
cent could just as well have been applied, but consideration 
to EEA support regulations places limitations on the 
formulation of the rules. The other provision is that the 
upper limit for the deduction is higher if the firm buys R&D 
services from an approved research institute. We have no 
evaluation results that allow us to draw strong conclusions 
regarding the scheme’s effectiveness on this point, but we 
find that this element of the scheme is well argued for. 
We do not believe there are good arguments for removing 
the caps in the scheme. The intention of the scheme is to 
act as a supplement to other R&D policy instruments, and 
in particular to ensure that some R&D support is available 
to firms with little R&D experience and prior contact with 
the Research Council of Norway or other parts of the 
innovation policy system. The financing of these firms’ 
R&D activity can be difficult, and to the extent that capital 
market imperfections are considered the main justification 
for the scheme, this suggests that the caps should be kept. 
In a system with no caps, firms with large R&D investments 
would be able to increase their R&D activity considerably. 
There is no reason to believe that these firms face severe 
financing constraints. In order to stimulate more R&D in 
large firms, the authorities should rather increase the 
availability of traditional R&D grants as suggested by the 
Hervik Commission. These grants should be directed 
towards projects with large externalities and low private 
returns. 
There is much focus on evaluating R&D subsidy schemes 
both in Norway and abroad. It is, however, considered an 
ideal that the schemes should be general, in the sense that 
they apply equally to all firms. This is somewhat 
contradictory. The reason for this is that the greater the 
degree of equal treatment in the scheme, the further away 
we are from the ideal evaluation situation with a 
comparison of recipients that are equal, except from the 
fact that some have access to the scheme and others do 
not. Given that economists and authorities are uncertain 
about the effectiveness of R&D policies, an evaluation 
design should be built into the schemes as argued by Jaffe 
(2002). Since a valid control group must be part of a good 
evaluation design, this implies that some agents that would 
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want to use the scheme must be excluded from it. 23 In 
other scientific fields, such as medicine, this is widely 
accepted. Hence, there is a trade-off between formulating 
the scheme optimally in relation to the knowledge available 
today, and formulating it so that it can be improved and 
work better in the future. 
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